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Abstract
This paper analytically derives the conditions under which the slope of the tax re-
action function is negative in a classical tax competition model. If countries maximize
welfare, we show that a negative slope (reflecting strategic substitutability) occurs un-
der relatively mild conditions. Simulations suggest that strategic substitutability occurs
under plausible parameter configurations. The strategic tax response is crucial for un-
derstanding tax competition games, as well as for assessing the welfare effects of partial
tax unions (whereby a subset of countries coordinate their tax rates). Indeed, contrary to
earlier findings that have assumed strategic complementarity in tax rates, we show that
partial tax unions might reduce welfare under strategic substitutability.
JEL codes: E62, F21, H25, H77
Keywords: Strategic Substitutes; Asymmetry; Strategic Tax Response; Tax Coordina-
tion.
1 Introduction
The welfare effects from tax coordination are crucially determined by the slope of the tax
reaction function in tax competition models. For example, Konrad and Schjelderup (1999)1
explore the impact of tax coordination whereby some countries opt in and others opt out of
a tax agreement (henceforth: tax unions). They show that a tax union is unambiguously
welfare improving if tax rates are strategic complements. Numerous studies do indeed start
from this presumption that tax rates are strategic complements by considering governments
that maximize tax revenues rather than welfare (see a.o. Kanbur and Keen, 1993). Others
rely on a linear utility function in which public goods are valued more than private goods
∗Corresponding author: Tinbergen Institute, Erasmus School of Economics, P.O. Box 1738, 3000 DR
Rotterdam, The Netherlands. Email: vrijburg@ese.eur.nl, Phone: +31-10-408-1481, Fax: +31-10-408-91 66
†IMF, CESifo and Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation. E-mail: RDeMooij@imf.org. Views are
those of the authors and should not be attributed to IMF or IMF policy.
1Burbidge, de Pater, Myers and Senqupta (1997) have shown in a classical paper that it might not be
feasible to design a cooperative policy that offers all countries a higher payoff compared to their best deviation
strategy. This underscores the relevance of studying enhanced cooperation agreements.
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(see a.o. Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano, 2008, and Bucovetsky, 2009). Both assumptions
rule out a negatively sloped tax reaction function a priori.
This paper analytically derives the conditions for the slope of the tax reaction function to
be negative (or: strategic substitutes) in a classical capital tax competition model whereby
governments maximize welfare, using a more generally specified utility function (see Zodrow
and Mieskowsky, 1986; Wilson, 1986; and Wildasin, 1988).2 We find that the conditions for
strategic substitutes are, in fact, rather mild. Hence, its case should not be ruled out as is
typically done. We also run simulations, showing that strategic substitutes occur under a
wide range of reasonable parameter values. Our results put serious doubts on the merits of
tax unions, which are based on the assumption of strategic complementarity. The analysis in
this paper reveals what circumstances make strategic substitutability more or less likely to
occur.
Strategic substitutability seems at odds with empirical findings on strategic tax setting.
For example, Devereux et al. (2008) find that, on average, countries respond by increasing
their tax rate in response to an increase in the average level of taxation in neighboring coun-
tries. However, this average response by no means rules out that some individual countries
will respond in an opposite manner. Furthermore, we have not yet seen anything as large as
the formation of a tax union. It can be questioned whether recent empirical findings shed
light on the long-run policy responses to such a large shock.
A very limited number of papers in the tax competition literature explicitly address the
case for strategic substitutes. Wildasin (1988), Bucovetsky (1991) and Wilson (1991) explore
tax competition in which countries can influence world market prices. While this introduces an
interesting strategic tax element, none of them explores the slope of the tax reaction function
(see also Brueckner, 2003).3 Brueckner and Saavedra (2001) are, to our knowledge, the first
to explicitly identify strategic substitutes for asymmetric countries. They, however, assume
2See a.o. Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985) for a classical reference on the discussion of strategic
complements and substitutes applied to industrial organization.
3Only Wilson (1991) makes a brief remark about the slope of the reaction function, saying that it depends
on the utility function and the production function, including ‘hard-to-interpret’properties like third derivatives
of the production functions (Wilson, 1991, p. 440, footnote 13). Laussel and Le Bretton (1998) study the
existence of Nash-Equilibria in tax competition models and also mention that reaction curves can be non-linear
(concave). Their model, however, is considerably more stylized than ours.
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a linear utility function, which is a very special case under which strategic substitutabil-
ity is rare. We generalize their result, which substantially broadens the scope for strategic
substitutability.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the tax-competition
model. Section 3 derives linearized tax reaction functions analytically and discusses conditions
for tax rates to be strategic substitutes. Section 4 simulates tax reaction functions and
illustrates the conditions derived. Section 5 discusses an application to illustrate the welfare
gains from the formation of tax unions in case of strategic substitutes. Section 6 concludes.
2 A model of tax-competition
Consider n ≥ 2 countries, that are potentially asymmetric. We use i, j ∈ {1, ..., n} with i 6= j
as country indices. Country i is populated by a fixed number of Ni immobile households.
Population size relative to world population (N) will be denoted by si = Ni/N . Each house-
hold in country i has a capital endowment (ei) and a labor endowment (l = 1), which they
supply inelastically. Hence, labor constitutes a fixed factor in production. Capital is perfectly
mobile internationally.
2.1 Firms and Capital Market Equilibrium
A representative firm in each country produces a single good using a stock of capital (Ki) and
effort from labor (Ni). There is perfect competition in the output market. In each country, the
production function F (Ki, Ni) is homogeneous of degree one, so it can be written in intensive
form: Nif(ki) where ki = Ki/Ni denotes the capital-labor ratio employed in country i. F (.) is
concave in its two inputs and twice continuously differentiable. Hence: f ′(ki) > 0, f ′′(ki) < 0.
Profit maximizing firms set the marginal product of capital equal to its price: the tax-inclusive
cost of capital. Firms face a distortionary source-based unit-specific tax on capital (ti).
4
4Lockwood (2004) studies the case for an ad-valorem tax rate. Results are comparable, although tax-
competition is more intense under ad-valorem tax rates as price changes magnify the impact of taxes. This
does not affect our results though.
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The first-order condition for profit maximization yields for all i
f ′i(ki) = ti + ρ. (1)
The after-tax rate-of-return on capital (ρ) is equal across countries due to the international
mobility of capital. That is, ρ is endogenously determined on the world’s capital market such
that Eqs. 1 hold and the resource constraint
n∑
i=1
siei =
n∑
i=1
siki ≡ K
N
(2)
is satisfied, where K denotes the fixed world capital stock.5 An increase in the tax rate of
country i (ti) reduces the capital stock in country i
∂ki
∂ti
=
1
f ′′i (.)
[
1 +
∂ρ
∂ti
]
< 0, (3)
which is obtained by partially differentiating Eq. 1, holding constant tj for j 6= i. Eq. 3 can
be signed using f ′′i (.) < 0 and the sign of the final term (see Appendix A for a derivation)
−1 < ∂ρ
∂ti
=
−si(1/f ′′i (.))∑n
j=1 sj(1/f
′′
j (.))
< 0. (4)
When all countries are small relative to the capital market, then we have ∂ρ/∂ti ≈ 0. This case
is studied in Zodrow and Mieskowsky (1986) and Wilson (1986). However, ρ unambiguously
decreases in ti if the number of countries is small and at least some countries are large
compared to the world capital market (see a.o. Wildasin, 1989; Bucovetsky, 1991 and Wilson,
1991). An increase in ti lowers the net marginal product in country i and causes capital to
relocate towards the remaining countries. If the capital flow is large compared to the world’s
capital market, this reduces the marginal product of capital abroad. The larger country i is
relative to the world’s capital market, the stronger its market power and larger is this effect.
5We assume (and make sure in our simulation analysis) that ρ > 0, ruling out the possibility that part of
the capital stock is not used.
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2.2 Consumers
A representative consumer features a twice-continuously differentiable, monotonously increas-
ing utility function of the form: Ui(gi, ci), where gi and ci denote, respectively public and
private consumption. Household private consumption is subject to a household budget con-
straint, given by
ci = [fi(.)− f ′i(.)ki] + ρei. (5)
Hence, private consumption equals the return to labor (the wage), reflected by the term
in between square brackets on the right-hand side of Eq. (5), plus interest income from the
capital endowment (ρei).
2.3 Government
The government maximizes welfare, which is determined by the utility of the representative
household, by choosing the tax rate ti. Thereby, it takes into account the government budget
constraint, which restricts public consumption to tax revenues
gi = tiki, (6)
and the tax rates decided on by the government of other countries: tj for all j 6= i. This latter
assumption implies that we study Nash-equilibria. For each country, the optimum satisfies
the following condition
∂Ui/∂ti
uc,i
=
[
∂ci
∂ti
]
+
ug,i
uc,i
[
∂gi
∂ti
]
= 0, (7)
where ug,i/uc,i > 0 is short-hand notation for ug,i(ci, gi)/uc,i(ci, gi) denoting the marginal
rate of substitution (MRS) between public and private goods. The right-hand side of Eq. (7)
measures the welfare effect of the tax via, respectively, changes in private consumption and
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public consumption, which are obtained by taking the partial derivatives of (5) and (6)
∂ci
∂ti
= −f ′′i (.)
∂ki
∂ti
ki +
∂ρ
∂ti
ei < 0, (8)
∂gi
∂ti
= ki
[
1 +
ti
ki
∂ki
∂ti
]
> 0. (9)
Eq. (8) shows that a higher tax rate reduces private consumption for two reasons. First,
a higher tax will cause an outflow of capital. The smaller capital stock reduces labor pro-
ductivity and, therefore, the wage and private consumption. Second, the higher tax reduces
the world net-of-tax return on capital and, therefore, interest income. This magnifies the
reduction in private consumption.
Eq. (9) shows that the effect of a higher tax on public consumption depends on where
we are on the Laffer curve. The first term on the right-hand side of Eq. (9) shows that a
higher tax raises revenue over the existing tax base. The second term indicates that a higher
tax causes an erosion of the tax base to the extent that it reduces the domestic capital stock.
This reduces tax revenue, especially when the initial tax rate is high. From Eq. (8) and (7),
it follows that a utility maximizing tax rate requires that Eq. (9) is positive. That is, the
utility maximizing tax rate is always on the upward sloping part of the Laffer curve.
Now define ηk,i ≡ −∂ki∂ti ≥ 0 as minus the tax coefficient of capital and ηr,i ≡ −
∂ρ
∂ti
≥ 0
as minus the tax coefficient of the interest rate. Together with Eq. (8), (9) and (3), we can
rewrite Eq. (7) as
ug,i
uc,i
=
ki + ηr,i [ei − ki]
ki − tiηk,i ≡MCF, (10)
reflecting the modified Samuelson rule. It shows that the marginal rate of substitution
between public and private goods on the left-hand side is equal to the marginal cost of public
funds (henceforth MCF) times the marginal rate of transformation (which equals unity in
our model). Eq. (10) shows that the MCF rises in the tax coefficient of capital ηk,i as this
increases the erosion of the tax base induced by the tax. Furthermore, the MCF in Eq. (10)
increases in ηr,i if country i is a net capital exporter (ei > ki). It decreases if it is a net capital
importer (ei < ki). Intuitively, a net capital exporter is a net receiver of interest vis-a-vis
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the rest of the world. Therefore, it suffers from a welfare loss if the interest rate drops. This
makes public goods more expensive as higher taxes reduce the interest rate. This implies that
for capital exporting countries we unambiguously have ug,i/uc,i = MCF > 1. This is the
standard tax competition result: the public good is undersupplied due to positive spillovers
from taxation. For a net capital importer, the lower interest rate is a net benefit because the
country pays less to foreign capital owners. This reduces the MCF. In principle, this might
even cause ug,i/uc,i = MCFi < 1 if the effect is large enough, implying that the public good
is oversupplied.
2.4 Equilibrium
Equilibrium is defined as a set of Nash-Equilibrium tax rates (ti for all i), capital stocks (ki
for all i) and an interest rate ρ that simultaneously satisfy for each country both the modified
Samuelson rule in Eq. (10) and the demand for capital in Eq. (1), and for all countries
together the world resource constraint.6 For an equilibrium to be welfare improving, we need
that the second-order condition for a welfare maximum is negative
∂ug,i/uc,i
∂ti
− ∂MCFi
∂ti
< 0.
With respect to the first term, we follow a.o. Bucovetsky (1991) and Taugourdeau and
Ziad (2011) by assuming that both gi and ci are normal goods. Together with the tax being
on the upward-sloping part of the Laffer curve, this implies that: ∂ug,i/uc,i/∂ti ≤ 0, i.e.
choosing a higher tax rate leads to a reduction in the marginal valuation of the public good.
The difficulty lies in proving that ∂MCFi/∂ti > 0. Bucovetsky (1991) shows that this
is the case for a quadratic production function, which has subsequently been used by a.o.
Bucovetsky (2009) and Devereux et al. (2008) (while Parry, 2003, assumes that ∂ki/∂ti
is linear in the relevant range). This assumption ensures that the tax base elasticity, k,i,
is unambiguously decreasing in the capital stock and that the Laffer curve of country i is
6Some papers have proven the existence of a Nash-equilibrium in models more stylized than ours, see e.g.
Laussel and Le Bretton (1998) and Bayindir-Upmann and Ziad (2005) , but for the model used here existence
has not yet been proven.
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unambiguously shifted outwards if capital flows in. In the next section, we will also use
the quadratic production function to avoid complications.7 However, our results continue
to hold under a more general production function that obeys the assumptions laid down in
Taugourdea and Ziad, see appendix B.
3 Strategic Tax Responses
We now explore the slope of the tax reaction function. If the slope is positive, then a tax in-
crease abroad will induce a country to also increase its own tax rate and we speak of ‘strategic
complements’. If the slope is negative, then a higher tax abroad will trigger a decrease in the
country’s own tax rate as a response and we refer to this as ‘strategic substitutes’.
In general, tax reaction functions take the form: ti = Vi(tj , t−j), where Vi(tj , t−j) gives
the best response of country i to the tax rates chosen by country j and all remaining countries
(where we denote the set of all countries not including countries i and j by −j). Because there
are no closed form expressions for the tax rates in general, we linearize the tax reaction around
an initial equilibrium. This yields analytical expressions for the tax change by country i in
response to tax changes in (one of) the other countries. The linearized tax responses reflect
optimal marginal tax responses, relative to an initial equilibrium, to an assumed exogenous
marginal change in the tax rate of country j (which might represent a group of countries that
uniformly raise their tax). Appendix B derives the linearized tax reaction functions, assuming
a CES utility function and a quadratic production function, f(k) = b(a − k)k. Denoting a
percentage change in variable x as: ∂x/x = ∂ ln(x) = x˜, the reaction function looks as follows
7For a more general production function, Taugourdea and Ziad (2011) show that a second-order locally
consistent equilibrium exists in case of a positive third derivative of the production function and the prescription
that the demand for capital should not be increasing in capital (∂ ln f ′i/∂ ln ki ≤ 0). These conditions hold for
a wide range of production functions commonly used in the economic literature, such as: i) Cobb-Douglas, ii)
Quadratic, iii) Logarithmic, iv) Exponential, v) Logistic, and vi) CES production function in case the capital
share in production, and/or the substitution elasticity between capital and the fixed factor, is not too large.
However, the result also requires that all capital is owned by individuals living outside the countries considered
(ei = 0).
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t˜i =
[(
ug,i
uc,i
+ ηr,i − 1
)
− (γiσ ) (1 + 2b ei−kici ki)] ′k,j(
2
ug,i
uc,i
+ ηr,i − 1
)
k,i +
γi
σ
(
1 + gici
)
+ γiσ
ei−ki
ci
tiηr,i − γiσ k,i
t˜j , (11)
where σ ≡ dlog(ci/gi)/dlog(MRSi) > 0 denotes the elasticity of substitution between public
and private goods. If σ is large, public and private goods are close substitutes, so that the
MRS is not strongly affected by changes in the ratio of private-to-public consumption. In the
limit σ → ∞ we approach a constant MRS. For other parameters, 0 < k,i ≡ tiηk,i/ki ≤ 1
denotes the own capital stock elasticity, ′k,j = (∂ki/∂tj)(tj/ki) = −tj/(kif ′′i )ηr,j > 0 indicates
a cross-elasticity and γi = −(∂ci/∂ti)/ki = 1 + (ei/ki− 1)ηr,i reflects the reduction in private
income following a tax increase relative to the initial capital stock.
The denominator on the right-hand side of Eq. (11) is positive by assumption as it equals
(minus) the second-order condition for a welfare maximum. Eq. (11) gives the marginal
slope of the reaction function of country i: if the coefficient on the right-hand side of (11) is
positive, then tax rates are strategic complements; otherwise, they are strategic substitutes.
Our focus will be on the prevalence of strategic substitutability, i.e. on cases under which
the coefficient is negative. To interpret the slope coefficient, we first discuss two special cases
that each highlight one particular channel. We then elaborate on the general case.
3.1 Special Case 1: constant MRS
First, assume a constant MRS equal to ug/uc. This would be the case if the utility function
were linear, which results in σ → ∞. This assumption is adopted by e.g. Devereux et al.
(2008), and Bucovetsky (2009). Note that if ug/uc →∞, welfare maximization coincides with
revenue maximization by the government, this is assumed by e.g. Kanbur and Keen (1993).
When assuming a constant MRS Eq. (11) reads as follows
t˜i =
(
ug
uc
+ ηr,i − 1
)
′k,j(
2
ug
uc
+ ηr,i − 1
)
k,i
t˜j for i 6= j. (12)
From this we can derive the following proposition
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Proposition 1. In case of a constant MRS, the tax reaction function is always positively
sloped as long as ug/uc > 1: tax rates are strategic complements. The slope of the reaction
function is steeper, the larger is the marginal valuation of public goods relative to private goods
(ug/uc).
To understand Eq. (12), note that a higher tax in country j will cause an inflow of capital
to country i, which is measured by ′k,j > 0. This boosts both private consumption, due
to a positive impact of the capital inflow on the wage rate, and public consumption as the
broadening of the domestic tax base raises public revenue if the tax rate is kept unchanged.
The optimal response in the tax rate depends on how consumers value public and private
consumption. The term ug/uc − 1 measures the extent to which the MRS between public
and private goods exceeds the marginal rate of transformation (MRT). According to modified
Samuelson rule (10), this occurs if the MCF exceeds unity in which case public goods are
scarcer than private goods due to distortionary taxation. Ignoring the term ηr,i, Eq. (12)
suggests that this would make it optimal for the government to raise public goods supply.
Intuitively, the exogenous inflow of capital on account of the higher tax rate abroad reduces
the MCF, making it less costly to supply public goods and allowing for a higher tax rate.
Accordingly, tax rates are strategic complements. 8
The tax response depends also on the impact of the change in ti on the interest rate,
which is measured by ηr,i. The extra inflow of capital as a result of a higher foreign tax rate
is cheaper if the interest rate that needs to be paid to foreign capital owners is lower. As
an increase in the domestic tax rate indeed reduces the interest rate by ηr,i, this encourages
country i to increase its domestic tax rate. This channel critically depends on country size,
however. Indeed, when n→∞ or if country i is very small relative to the rest of the world,
this channel becomes irrelevant, i.e. ηr,i is close to zero.
8Undersupply of the public good (ug/uc > 1) is a feature of standard tax competition models, where tax
competition leads countries to choose inefficiently low tax rates (Zodrow and Mieszkowsky, 1986; and Wilson,
1986). The importance of ug/uc > 1 was also stressed by Saavedra and Brueckner (2001), who argued that
countries with a low valuation of public goods (ug < uc) might feature a negatively sloped tax reaction function.
In our model, this is the case only if the MCF would be smaller than unity.
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3.2 Special Case 2: Endogenous MRS with Symmetric Countries
The second special case we consider is when the MRS is no longer constant, but countries are
symmetric. This would imply si = 1/n, ei = ki = e, Ui(c, g) = U(c, g) for given c, g and all
i ∈ {1 : n}. Also note that, γi = −(∂ci/∂ti)/ki = 1, under symmetry. The marginal slope of
the reaction function is now given by
t˜i =
(
ug
uc
+ ηr,i − 1− 1σ
)
′k,j(
2
ug
uc
+ ηr,i − 1− 1σ
)
k,i +
(
1 + gc
)
1
σ
t˜j , (13)
As the denominator is positive by assumption, the slope of the reaction function in Eq.
(13) is determined by the sign of the numerator, which depends on two terms. The term
(ug/uc + ηr,i − 1) is the same as in Eq. (12). The other term in the numerator of Eq. (13) is
reflected in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. With symmetric countries, the slope of the tax reaction function might be
negative (strategic substitutes), even if ug/uc > 1. At a given ug/uc, the likelihood of strategic
substitutability declines in σ: the willingness to substitute private for public goods.
As noted before, the higher tax rate in country j causes an inflow of capital in country
i. The broader tax base raises public funds and yields more public goods. If public and
private goods are close substitutes (a large value for σ), then there is little reason to reduce
the tax rate in order to replace public by private consumption. However, if public and private
goods are close complements (a small value for σ), then the government will find it optimal
to cut the tax rate so as to boost private consumption along with public consumption. This
may cause tax rates to be strategic substitutes. Indeed, even if ug/uc > 1, we could have a
negatively sloped reaction curve if σ is sufficiently small. Interestingly, the case for strategic
substitutes is strengthened when n increases, leading to a lower value of ηr,i.
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3.3 General Case
Eq. (11) allows for asymmetry so that countries can be either importers or exporters of
capital. This affects the slope of the tax reaction function, which is reflected in the following
proposition.
Proposition 3. With asymmetric countries, ceteris paribus, the prevalence of strategic sub-
stitutes is more likely when country i is a capital exporter.
In what follows, we will focus on a country that is a capital exporter in equilibrium, in
which case ei > ki such that γi > 1. The reverse would hold in the case of a capital importer.
Given a positive denominator, the numerator in Eq. (11) reveals that a capital exporter is
more likely to have a downward sloping tax reaction function via two terms. The first is
captured by the term 2bki(ei − ki)/ci, which is positive only for a capital exporter. The
second is captured by the parameter γi = (∂ci/∂ti)/ki = 1 + ηr,i(ei/ki − 1) > 1 for ei > ki
and which increases in the amount of capital exports. Both terms magnify the substitution
effect from public to private consumption, discussed in the previous subsection. Intuitively,
a capital exporter faces a larger MCF, as seen in Eq. (10) since taxes are more distortionary.
The inflow of capital from abroad mitigates this distortion and induces a larger substitution
effect at the margin if the initial equilibrium is more distorted. The size of the effect still
critically depends on the value for σ. Indeed, if public and private consumption are close
substitutes, there is little reason for the government to reduce the tax rate in order to boost
private consumption along with public consumption. Thus, a negatively sloped reaction curve
will be less likely. In fact, if σ → ∞, we saw in the first special case that the third effect
disappears, irrespective of whether a country is exporting or importing capital. If public and
private consumption are complementary, however, strategic substitutability is more likely,
especially for capital exporting countries.
Proposition 3 holds only ceteris paribus. In fact, country characteristics reflected by model
parameters may simultaneously affect the different components of the initial equilibrium in
Eq. (11) and, therefore, the prevalence of strategic substitutes. For example, consider country
size. Bigger countries exert more power on international capital markets so that ∂ηr,i/∂si > 0.
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This makes strategic complementarity more likely for them. At the same time, however,
large countries will set higher tax rates because they face a lower MCF (i.e. ∂MCF/∂si <
0). This makes large countries more likely to be capital exporters which, as long as σ is
small enough, makes strategic substitutability more likely. Also preference parameters in the
utility function could simultaneously affect the ratio ug/uc and the likelihood of being capital
exporter. Moreover, rich countries with a relatively large capital endowment are more likely
to export capital, making strategic substitutability more likely. At the same time, however,
capital exporters have more private income and, hence, value public goods more at the margin
(higher ug/uc) for a given tax rate. This can make strategic complementarity more likely. In
the next section, these interactions are important for the simulations.
4 Simulated Tax Reaction Functions
While linearization offers insight in the parameters determining the slope of the tax reaction
function, it offers only insight in the local not in the global properties of the tax reaction
functions. This subsection illustrate the global properties by simulating tax reaction curves
for a range of tax rates. The simulations suggest that the results from propositions 1, 2 and
3 indeed hold globally.
In performing the simulations, we make a number of assumptions. Throughout the exer-
cises, we use a quadratic production function: f(k) = b(a− ki)ki and assume three countries
(n = 3). In the first two simulations, countries are symmetric (e = k = 1) and of equal size
(s = 1/3). This gives simple expressions for public and private consumption, as well as for
the MCF: c = b(a− 1)− t; g = t and MCF = 11−t/(2b)(2/3) . In the calibration, we set t = 1/2
and b = 1/2, implying that MCF = 3/2. We consider two utility functions. In the first
simulation, we use a linear utility function, U = c+(ug/uc)g, with a constant ug/uc and then
vary the value of ug/uc. In the second and third simulation, we adopt a CES utility function
U = (ωc1−1/σ + (1 − ω)g1−1/σ)σ/(σ−1), whereby we set ω = 1/2. To satisfy the modified
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Samuelson rule, the equilibrium must satisfy (using b = t = 1/2)
ug
uc
=
1− ω
ω
(
c
g
)1/σ
= (a− 2)1/σ. (14)
To allow for variation in σ to illustrate proposition 2, we adjust the parameter a along
with σ to hold constant ug/uc in Eq. (14)
a =
3((ug/uc)
σ + 1)(ug/uc − 1)
ug/uc
+ 1 = (3/2)σ + 2 (15)
In the third simulation, we consider asymmetry across countries. In particular, we assume
that country i is more capital abundant. Thereby, we set σ = 1 and a = 3.5 to ensure
ug/uc = 3/2. Figures 1, 2 and 3 show the tax reaction curves for country i together with the
45 degrees line (dotted).
[Figure 1 about here.]
In the first simulation with a linear utility function and symmetric countries, we set a = 5
such that f(.) = 2. We consider three different values of ug/uc ∈ {2/3, 3/2, 3}. Figure 1
shows that the tax rate set by country i rises in the MRS, reflecting a higher marginal value
of public goods, relative to private goods. Consistent with proposition 1, the slope of the
tax reaction curve is steeper for higher values of ug/uc. For ug/uc = 2/3, we see that the
slope of the reaction curve is precisely zero. Indeed, for si = 1/3 we have ηr,i = 1/3 so that
ug/uc + ηr,i − 1 = 0.9
[Figure 2 about here.]
In the second simulation, we vary σ ∈ {∞, 5, 1, 0.2}, while simultaneously adjusting a to
keep ug/uc = 3/2.
10 Figure 2 shows, consistent with proposition 2, that the slope of the
tax reaction function is increasing in σ. For a Cobb-Douglas utility function (σ = 1), the
9For this latter case, we decreased ei such that country i is a capital importer to make sure it chooses a
positive tax rate. Note that this does not affect the slope of the reaction function as defined in Eq. (12) for
the case of linear utility function.
10Wildasin (1989) and Parry (2003) study a range of [0.2 - 1] and [0.3 - 1] for σ, respectively, and stress that
scarce empirical evidence points to an inelastic demand for public goods (see also Rubinfeld, 1987).
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tax reaction function is downward sloping but rather flat. For lower values of σ, the slope
becomes more negative.
[Figure 3 about here.]
Figure 3 sets σ = 1 and varies the capital endowment of country i: ei ∈ {1, 3/2, 5/2}.
The larger its capital endowment, the more negative is the net foreign asset position of the
country. Consistent with proposition 3, Figure 3 shows that the slope of the tax reaction
function becomes more negative when country 3 exports more capital.
5 Application: Coalition Formation in Capital Taxation
Tax reaction functions are important for the analysis of tax competition. From a policy
perspective, they are also critical when studying the welfare effects of a partial tax union
(see Konrad and Schjelderup, 1999). To illustrate, this section performs simulations of the
welfare effects when a subgroup of countries forms a tax union. The section highlights the
importance of tax reactions for the likelihood of a partial tax union, as well as the welfare
effects.
In the simulations, we again use the three-country version of the model and adopt the
same calibration as in the previous section. In analyzing a partial tax union, we assume
that countries 1 and 2 harmonize (h) their tax system and form a tax union (henceforth the
union countries). Country 3 remains outside the union. The union countries are assumed
symmetric throughout the analysis, where s = s1 = s2 denotes their share in the world
population. The union countries choose a joint tax rate th that maximizes the sum of welfare
in the two countries: sU1(.) + sU2(.) = 2sUh(.), given the tax rate chosen by country 3.
11
The government of country 3 chooses t3 to maximize the welfare of its citizens, given the tax
rate of the union countries. We allow country 3 to be either smaller or larger than countries
11Assuming symmetry between countries 1 and 2 implies that we side-step the complications that arise in
case of a union between asymmetric countries. When union members are asymmetric, both their preference
for the optimal union policy and the payoff from cooperation might differ. Our approach is familiar in the
literature on coalitions, see for example Kennan and Riezman (1990).
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1 and 2 in terms of population. Furthermore, we allow country 3 to have a larger capital
endowment. Preferences are the same in all countries.
In exploring the impact of a tax union on tax rates and welfare, we compare the decen-
tralized equilibrium (indicated by superscript “D”), where all three countries choose their
tax rate independently in a Nash setting, with the equilibrium where countries 1 and 2 have
formed a tax union (indicated by superscript “H”).
5.1 Predictions
We first explore comparative statics to understand how a tax union is expected to affect tax
rates. For country 3, there is no direct impact of a tax union. Indeed, the parameters ηDk,3
and ηDr,3 do not change due to the formation of a tax union by the other countries. Country
3 is, however, affected through the change in tax policy in the union countries to the extent
that this modifies the allocation of capital k3 and the interest rate ρ. For countries 1 and 2,
the parameters ηDk,i and η
D
r,i do change through the formation of a tax union. This will affect
the optimal choices regarding tax rates and, therefore, outcomes. First, Appendix A derives
the elasticities under a tax union and finds that ηHk,h < η
D
k,1 = η
D
k,2. The reason is that the
joint policy response by countries 1 and 2 eliminates spillovers upon each other. Accordingly,
evaluated at the decentralized equilibrium values of ti and ki, the formation of a tax union will
generally reduce the MCF. This gives the union countries an incentive to raise their tax rate.
Second, Appendix A also shows that ηHr,h = 2η
D
r,1 = 2η
D
r,2. As the union countries together are
twice the size of a single country, the interest rate response to the tax is twice as large. This
larger tax coefficient of the interest rate further reduces the MCFHh if the union countries
are net capital importers. However, a larger interest coefficient mitigates the reduction in the
MCFHh when union countries are net capital exporters, and could in principle even dominate
the reduction in ηk,i.
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Following Konrad, Schjelderup (1999, p. 161), we derive the marginal change in welfare
for the union countries in response to a marginal increase in the joint tax rate
∂Uh
∂th
1
uc,h
∣∣∣∣
th=t
D
1
=
[
(kh − eh) + (ug,h/uc,h)th
2b
]
s
(
1 +
(1− 2s)
s
∂t3
∂th
)
(16)
where we use: ηr,i = si (under a quadratic production function). The first term between
square brackets is unambiguously positive if the union countries are capital importers (kh >
eh). The higher tax raises welfare, both due to an increase in public consumption and because
the reduction in the interest rate raises welfare. If the union countries are net capital exporters,
however, the latter effect can be opposite as the higher tax lowers net interest income received
from abroad.
In Eq. (16), the slope of the tax reaction function enters via the term between round
brackets. This term is always positive under strategic complementary as the outside country
will adopt a tax response of the same sign as that chosen by the union countries. However,
the term may become negative under strategic substitutability. Under symmetry (kh = eh),
we would need ∂t3/∂th < −1 for union countries to experience a welfare loss from marginally
increasing their tax rate. This would be an unusual case, which we may exclude.12 If country
3 gets larger compared to countries 1 and 2, however, welfare losses in the union countries
may occur under weaker conditions. In particular, the strength the strategic substitutability
should be such that: ∂t3/∂th < −s/(1− 2s).
The change in welfare in country 3 (before it has adjusted its tax rate) is given by
∂U3
∂th
1
uc,3
∣∣∣∣
t3=tD3
=
[
(k3 − e3) + γ3t3
2b
]
2s.
12For n symmetric countries the condition for a welfare loss to occur is ∂t3/∂th < −1/(n − 2). While
recognizing that two countries change their tax rate: 2′k,j = (1/bn) we can rewrite Eq. 13 as ∂t3/∂th =
A/(A+B)(1/2)(n−1)], with A ≡ (ug/uc+1/n−1−1/σ), B ≡ (1+g/c)(1/σ)ug/(ug−uc)+ug/uc > 0 (using the
definition of MCF). When A < 0, the second-order condition for a welfare maximum requires that A+B > 0, or:
A/B > −1. The condition for a welfare loss to occur can be reformulated into: A/B < −(n−1)/(n−3) < −1,
which contradicts with the second-order condition for a welfare maximum.
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Welfare in country 3 always rises if the tax union increases its tax rate, as it benefits from an
inflow of capital. Only if country 3 exports a lot of capital, a reduction in net interest income
may imply that welfare could decrease.
5.2 Simulations
Table (1) presents the simulation results under alternative parameter values. The calibration
follows Section 4, whereby the rows in the Table indicate how the parameters are varied. In
particular, we consider several combinations whereby we consider two values for MRS (3/2
and 3), two values for σ (1 and 0.2), and three values for the size of the countries that form
a tax union (s = 2/5, 1/3 and 1/6). Furthermore, we allow country 3 to have a relative large
capital endowment: e3 = 1/(1− 2s)− 2s/(1− 2s)eh, affecting its capital exports.
Columns (5) and (6) show the decentralized equilibrium tax rates. In the symmetric
equilibrium, we have set t = 0.5. We see that larger countries set higher tax rates, as in
Bucovetsky (1991) and Wilson (1991). A larger capital endowment has an ambiguous effect
on the equilibrium tax rate.13 A higher MRS (ug/uc) comes along with a higher tax rate
since public goods are valued more.
[Table 1 about here.]
Column (7) shows the percentage change in the equilibrium tax rates by countries 1 and 2,
after a tax union is formed. A positive sign reflects an increased tax rate, while a negative sign
reflects a reduction. We see that the union countries always increase their tax rates (tHh > t
D
h )
after forming a tax union. The tax increase by the union countries is increasing in their size.
Intuitively, spillover between two larger countries are large, relative to spillovers vis-a-vis a
small third country. When union countries import capital (eu < 1), the tax increase is also
generally larger, since the lower interest rate that a tax increase would induce benefits net
capital importers at the expense of capital exporters.
13A larger capital endowment affects both sides of the modified Samuelson rule in Eq. (10). First, as
discussed by Peralta and Van Ypersele (2005, 2006), a larger capital endowment causes a larger MCF such
that ‘rich’ countries have an incentive to choose a lower equilibrium tax rate compared to ‘poor’countries.
On the other hand, more interest income causes more private incomes which increases the relative marginal
valuation of public goods (MRS increases), giving an incentive to raise the tax rate.
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Column (8) shows that the response by the non-union country varies, reflecting either
strategic complementarity or strategic substitutability. In fact, country 3 reduces its tax
rate in most cases reported in Table 1 consistent with strategic substitutability. Hence,
strategic substitutability does not require unreasonable parameters and might in fact be
quite a reasonable case in tax competition models when governments maximize welfare. If
union countries increase their tax rate by more, then we see that also the change by country
3 gets larger.
The last two columns present the welfare effects measured by the compensating variation
(CV ) as a percentage of total production of a country: f(ki) = (a−bki)ki. The CVi represents
the increase in private consumption that is required under the tax union equilibrium to make
the citizens of country i equally well off as compared to the decentralized equilibrium. A
negative value therefore indicates a welfare gain from the formation of a tax union; a positive
value reflects a welfare loss. We see that in most cases both countries gain from the formation
of a tax union. This gain is bigger when large countries form a tax union and when tax rates
are strategic complements. Country 3 only looses from the tax union between countries 1
and 2 when it is a capital exporter. The union countries suffer a welfare loss when (i) the
union countries are small compared to the non-union country; and (ii) the non-union country
responds to the tax increase by the union countries by reducing its own tax rate.14
6 Conclusion
This paper analytically derives the conditions for tax rates to be strategic substitutes in an
asymmetric tax-competition model. These conditions appear to be rather weak as long as
governments maximize welfare and utility is generally specified. Simulations further suggest
that strategic substitutability might hold under plausible parameter configurations. This has
important implications for the welfare effects of tax unions. For instance, earlier papers have
either explicitly or implicity assumed that tax rates are strategic complements and found
14A welfare loss for the countries that form a tax union can be avoided when assuming a Stackelberg-leader
game, where the union countries act as the Stackelberg leader. In this case, strategic substitutes still leads to
a welfare loss, but now all is on account of country 3, as the union countries foresee the ‘aggressive’ response
by country 3 (see de Mooij and Vrijburg, 2010, for a discussion).
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that the formation of tax unions is unambiguously welfare improving for the participating
countries. In the presence of strategic substitutes, however, we show that the formation of a
tax union might actually reduce welfare for the union countries since the adverse response in
the outside country may offset the benefits of forming the union.
Our paper leaves room for several extensions. First, one may want to allow for a more
general class of government objectives, including the Leviathan government, as in Edwards
and Keen (1996). Second, endogenous coalition formation along the lines of Kempf and Rota
Grasiosi (2010) may shed new light on strategic tax interactions. Which tax unions will be
formed, and how does this related to existence of strategic substitutes? We leave these topics
for future research.
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Appendix A: Deriving Elasticities
This appendix derives the tax coefficients ηk,i and ηr,i for different taxation regimes considered
in the text. It considers the case of decentralization and the partial tax union. We first
differentiate Eq. (1) to show how a change in the tax rate in country i affects the capital
stock in countries i and j
∂ki
∂ti
=
1
f ′′i (.)
[
1 +
∂ρ
∂ti
]
, (A.1)
∂kj
∂ti
=
1
f ′′j (.)
[
∂ρ
∂ti
]
for j 6= i. (A.2)
From Eq. (2) it follows that the total size of the capital stock is fixed, therefore
si
∂ki
∂ti
= −
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
sj
∂kj
∂ti
. (A.3)
Combining Eq. (A.1), (A.2) and (A.3) we obtain
0 >
∂ρ
∂ti
=
−si/f ′′i (.)∑n
j=1 sj/f
′′
j (.)
= −ηDr,i > −1. (A.4)
filling this in Eq. (A.1) gives
∂ki
∂ti
=
1
f ′′i (.)
[∑n
j=1,j 6=i sj/f
′′
j (.)∑n
j=1 sj/f
′′
j (.)
]
= −ηDk,i < 0, (A.5)
When m countries harmonize their taxes (h), we obtain: ki = kh, f
′′
i (.) = f
′′
h (.) and ti = th
for i ∈ M where M denotes the set of cooperating countries. Note, we assume si = s for
i ∈M . The following two equations describe the capital market
f ′′i (.)
∂ki
∂th
=
1
f ′′i (.)
[
1 +
∂ρ
∂th
]
for i ∈M, (A.6)
f ′′j (.)
∂kj
∂th
=
1
f ′′j (.)
∂ρ
∂th
for j /∈M, (A.7)
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Combining Eq. (A.6), (A.7) and (A.3) we obtain
0 > −ηDri >
∂ρ
∂th
=
−ms/f ′′h (.)∑n
j=1 sj/f
′′
j (.)
= −ηHr,i > −1 for i ∈M (A.8)
filling this into Eq. (A.6) gives
∂ki
∂th
=
1
f ′′i (.)
[∑n
j=1,j /∈M sj/f
′′
j (.)∑n
j=1 sj/f
′′
j (.)
]
= −ηHk,i > −ηDki for i ∈M. (A.9)
Appendix B: Derviation of the linearized tax reaction function
We linearize the tax reaction function around an initial equilibrium. We do this by linearizing
Eq. (10), which equates the MRS between public and private goods and the MCF. Thus, we
first linearize the MRS and then the MCF. We denote a percentage change in variable x as:
∂x/x = ∂ ln(x) = x˜.
Linearizing the MRS
We linearize the MRS on the left-hand side of Eq. (10) for a Constant-Elasticity-of-Substitution
(CES) utility function15
U =
[
ωic
(σ−1)/σ
i + (1− ωi)g(σ−1)/σi
] σ
σ−1
, (B.1)
yielding
M˜RSi ≡ ∂ ln
(
ug,i
uc,i
)
=
c˜i − g˜i
σ
, (B.2)
where σ ≡ dlog(ci/gi)/dlog(MRSi) > 0 denotes the elasticity of substitution between public
and private goods. If σ is large, public and private goods are close substitutes, so that the
MRS is not much affected by changes in the ratio of private-to-public consumption. In the
limit σ →∞ we approach a constant MRS.
15Note, for our main argument we need a utility function that is characterized by a decreasing marginal
valuation of public goods (or tax revenue), for example a log-linear utility function: Ui = ci + γlog(gi). We
restrict our attention to CES utility function to facilitate easy interpretation.
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We substitute Eq. (1) into the household budget constraint Eq. (5) to eliminate f ′i and
obtain for private consumption: ci = fi(.) + ρ(e− ki)− tiki. Linearizing this expression and
combining it with the government budget constraint in Eq. (6), we arrive at an expression
for the linearized ratio of private-to-public consumption
c˜i − g˜i = −k˜i −
(
1 +
gi
ci
)
t˜i +
(ei − ki)ρ
ci
ρ˜. (B.3)
As a final step towards a linearized MRS as function of tax rates only, we linearize the
capital market equilibrium in Eq. (2) and the first-order condition for firms in Eq. (1).
Combining yields
k˜i = −k,it˜i + ′k,j t˜j , (B.4)
ρ˜ = − ti
ρ
ηr,it˜i − tj
ρ
ηr,j t˜j , (B.5)
where 0 < k,i ≡ tiηk,i/ki ≤ 1 denotes the own capital stock elasticity, and ′k,j = (∂ki/∂tj)(tj/ki) =
−tj/(kif ′′i )ηr,j > 0 represents a cross-elasticity. Substituting Eqs. (B.3), (B.4, and (B.5) into
Eq. (B.2) leads to
M˜RSi = − 1
σ
(
1 +
gi
ci
+
(ei − ki)ti
ci
ηr,i − k,i
)
t˜i − 1
σ
(
′k,j +
(ei − ki)tj
ci
ηr,j
)
t˜j . (B.6)
The first term shows that the MRS is either increasing or decreasing in the own tax. Intu-
itively, as the optimal tax rate is always on the upward sloping part of the Laffer curve, a
higher tax implies more tax revenues and, hence, a lower marginal valuation of extra tax rev-
enues. On the other hand, private consumption might both increase or decrease, depending
on whether the country is a capital importer or exporter, making the whole term ambiguous.
The second term shows that the MRS decreases following an increased foreign tax when coun-
try i does not import too much capital. The inflow of capital causes a relative large increase
in tax revenues relative to private consumption causing a lower relative marginal valuation of
tax revenues. For large capital importers, the reduction in the interest rate implies a relative
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large increase in private consumption which reduces the relative marginal valuation of private
income.
Linearizing the MCF
Next, we use Eq. (10) to linearized the MCF
M˜CFi =
1
γi
[
ug,i
uc,i
k,it˜i −
(
ug,i
uc,i
− 1 + ηr,i
)
k˜i +
ug,i
uc,i
k,iη˜k,i +
(
ei − ki
ki
)
ηr,iη˜r,i
]
, (B.7)
with γi = −(∂ci/∂ti)/ki = 1 + (ei/ki − 1)ηr,i. The final two terms disappear when using a
quadratic production function: f(k) = b(a − k)k. Using this function, and Eqs. (3)-(4), we
obtain simple expressions for the coefficients ηk,i and ηr,i
ηk,i =
1− si
2b
, ηr,i = si
such that η˜k,i = 0 and η˜r,i = 0. This quadratic production function, being the standard in
the literature, will be used throughout the main analyzes in this paper, yielding16
M˜CFi =
1
γi
[
ug,i
uc,i
k,it˜i −
(
ug,i
uc,i
− 1 + ηr,i
)
k˜i
]
. (B.8)
The first term on the right-hand side of Eq. (B.8) shows that the MCF is increasing in
the own tax rate ti. This effect is stronger the larger the capital outflow, k,i. Second, an
increase in the capital stock (k˜i > 0) reduces the MCF when public goods are under-supplied
(ug,i > uc,i).
Linearized Reaction Function
Now substitute Eq. (B.4) into Eq. (B.8), and note that, in equilibrium, the relative change in
the MRS given in Eq. (B.6) should equal the relative change in the MCF given in Eq. (B.8):
16A quadratic production function is used by amongst others Bucovetsky (1991, 2009), Devereux et al.
(2008), Parry (2003) and Wilson (1991). It is very useful as it ensures that the tax base elasticity, k,i, is
unambiguously decreasing in the capital stock. This implies that the Laffer curve of country i is unambiguously
shifted outwards upon a capital inflow. In doing so, it rules out strategic substitutes occurring through an
increase in the MCF. This does not necessarily hold for a more general production function, which we discuss
briefly in Appendix B.
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M˜RSi = M˜CF i. After rewriting, this yields
t˜i =
[(
ug,i
uc,i
+ ηr,i − 1
)
− (γiσ ) (1 + 2b ei−kici ki)] ′k,j(
2
ug,i
uc,i
+ ηr,i − 1
)
k,i +
γi
σ
(
1 + gici
)
+ γiσ
ei−ki
ci
tiηr,i − γiσ k,i
t˜j , (B.9)
where the denominator is positive by assumption as it equals (minus) the second-order con-
dition for a welfare maximum. Eq. (B.9) gives the marginal slope of the reaction function of
country i.
General production function
Next, we consider a linearization of ηk,i and ηr,i for a more general production function. We
simplify the analysis by focusing on the three country case (i, j, k). First, note that from Eqs.
1 it follows that: f ′′(.)∂kj = f ′′(.)∂kk, such that from Eq. 2 it follows that
∂kj
∂ki
=
−si/f ′′j (.)
sj/f ′′j (.) + sk/f
′′
k (.)
,
∂kk
∂ki
=
−si/f ′′k (.)
sj/f ′′j (.) + sk/f
′′
k (.)
. (B.10)
Using this we can differentiate Eq. (A.8)
∂ρ/∂ti
∂ki
=
si
(∆)2
[
f ′′′i (.)
(f ′′i (.))2
∆− 1
f ′′i (.)
(
sif
′′′
i (.)
(f ′′i (.))2
+
sjf
′′′
j (.)
(f ′′j (.))2
∂kj
∂ki
+
skf
′′′
k (.)
(f ′′k (.))2
∂kk
∂ki
)]
, (B.11)
with ∆ = si(1/f
′′
i (.)) + sj(1/f
′′
j (.)) + sk(1/f
′′
k (.)). Which can be rewritten as
∂ρ/∂ti
∂ki
=
ηr,i
ki
kif
′′
i
∆
[
sif
′′′
i (.)
(f ′′i (.))3
(
sj/f
′′
j (.) + sk/f
′′
k (.)
si/f ′′i (.)
)
+
(
sjf
′′′
j (.)
(f ′′j (.))3
+
skf
′′′
k (.)
(f ′′k (.))3
)(
si/f
′′
i (.)
sj/f ′′j (.) + sk/f
′′
k (.)
)]
= −ηr,iδi
ki
< 0 (B.12)
such that δi > 0. The sign follows from the assumption f
′′′
i > 0. An increase in the capital
stock increases the influence of country i on the interest rate, ηr,i increases. Now use Eq.
(A.5) to derive
∂ki/∂ti
∂ki
=
1
f ′′i (.)
(
∂ρ/∂ti
∂ki
)
− f
′′′
i (.)
f ′′i (.)
(
∂ki
∂ti
)
. (B.13)
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An ambiguity arises, more market power (the first term in Equation (B.13)) leads to a re-
duction in ηk,i. On the other hand, the inflow of capital makes the marginal return more
sensitive to changes in the capital stock, causing a negative second term. Summarizing
η˜r,i = δik˜i, η˜k,i = −
[
f ′′′i ki
f ′′i
+
ηr,iδi
1− ηr,i
]
k˜i
When inspecting Eq. (B.7) for the case of symmetric countries (ei/ki−1 = 0), Eq. (B.13)
implies that a general production function might either cause the MCF to decrease further
through a capital inflow (in case the second term in Eq. (B.13) dominates) or raise it (in case
the first term in Eq. (B.13) dominates). The former case strengthens strategic complements,
the latter case strengthens strategic substitutes. In general, a quadratic production function
causes an unambiguous reduction in the MCF through an inflow of capital. It rules out
strategic substitutes occurring through an increase in the MCF. A more general production
function, allows for this.
When inspecting Eq. (B.9), we see that for a capital exporter (ei > ki) a general produc-
tion function causes a capital inflow to increase the MCF relative to the case with a quadratic
production function due to an increase in ηr,i. Ceteris paribus, this strengthens the case of
strategic substitutes and strengthens proposition 3.
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Figure 1: Tax Reaction Function Country i for constant ug/uc
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Figure 2: Tax Reaction Function Country i for endogenous ug/uc
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Figure 3: Tax Reaction Function Country i under asymmetric capital positions ei 6= ki
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Table 1: Simulation Results
ug
uc
σ s eh t
D
1 t
D
3 ∆th ∆t3 CVh CV3
3/2 1 2/5 1 0.51 0.48 12.7 % -0.5 % -0.008 -0.036
3/2 1 2/5 3/4 0.52 0.50 18.5 % -4.5 % -0.012 0.002
3/2 1 1/3 1 0.50 0.50 10.9 % -0.3 % -0.005 -0.024
3/2 1 1/3 3/4 0.50 0.50 15.5 % -1.8 % -0.008 -0.018
3/2 1 1/6 1 0.47 0.56 5.8 % -0.1 % -0.001 -0.005
3/2 1 1/6 3/4 0.46 0.55 7.8 % -0.2 % -0.002 -0.006
3/2 1/5 2/5 1 0.50 0.49 2.7 % -0.5 % -0.001 -0.008
3/2 1/5 2/5 3/4 0.50 0.50 4.3 % -2.4 % -0.002 0.000
3/2 1/5 1/3 1 0.50 0.50 2.4 % -0.4 % -0.001 -0.006
3/2 1/5 1/3 3/4 0.50 0.50 3.7 % -1.2 % -0.001 -0.005
3/2 1/5 1/6 1 0.49 0.51 1.5 % -0.1 % 0.000 -0.002
3/2 1/5 1/6 3/4 0.49 0.51 2.1 % -0.2 % 0.000 -0.002
3 1 2/5 1 0.53 0.46 33.7 % 8.9 % -0.068 -0.223
3 1 2/5 3/4 0.51 0.50 36.0 % 13.5 % -0.065 -0.330
3 1 1/3 1 0.50 0.50 26.5 % 6.4 % -0.049 -0.150
3 1 1/3 3/4 0.48 0.52 28.3 % 8.1 % -0.047 -0.201
3 1 1/6 1 0.47 0.67 10.9 % 1.1 % -0.010 -0.031
3 1 1/6 3/4 0.45 0.67 11.8 % 1.1 % -0.010 -0.035
3 1/5 2/5 1 0.51 0.48 8.0 % -1.5 % -0.012 -0.070
3 1/5 2/5 3/4 0.47 0.54 8.4 % 2.2 % -0.013 -0.280
3 1/5 1/3 1 0.50 0.50 8.1 % -1.7 % -0.008 -0.057
3 1/5 1/3 3/4 0.46 0.56 7.7 % -0.4 % -0.008 -0.122
3 1/5 1/6 1 0.47 0.55 4.8 % -0.7 % 0.001 -0.013
3 1/5 1/6 3/4 0.43 0.57 4.3 % -0.7 % 0.002 -0.012
Notes: For all simulations, we choose ω = 1/2. The parameter b in the production function f = b(a−k)k, is
calibrate on the symmetric equilibrium, using t = 1/2, such that b follows from the choice of ug/uc = MCF .
a follows from the choice of σ such that the MRS equals the desired value of ug/uc. See Section 4 for a
discussion.
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